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The most generally accepted and best documented manipulation in procedural justice experiments is
varying whether or not participants are allowed an opportunity to voice their opinion about a decision.
To better understand the psychology of voice, the authors focus on Referent Cognitions Theory (RCT).
It is argued that thus far RCT has not been used to explain the psychology of voice and that previous RCT
research suffers from methodological problems and has been more outcome oriented than necessary. Two
experiments resolve these problems and show that people react more strongly to procedures (especially
no-voice procedures) when reference points are close as opposed to distant. These findings suggest that
closeness of reference points plays an important role in the psychology of voice. The findings expand
RCT in significant ways and indicate that insight into the role of reference points is essential for
understanding the psychology of justice.
Social justice plays a key role in human life. For example, being
treated fairly by one's organization and the people who work in the
organization typically leads to higher ratings of positive affect,
more positive judgments about one's relationship with the orga-
nization and the people involved, higher commitment to the orga-
nization, and more extra-role citizenship behavior (e.g., Lind &
Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Tyler & Smith, 1998). People
who experience unfair treatment, on the other hand, are more
likely to report higher ratings of negative affect, leave their jobs,
start behaving in anti-normative ways, and show lower levels of
commitment (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998). These findings show
that fairness plays a crucial role in social behavior. It is therefore
important to study people's concerns about justice (Lind & Tyler,
1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Social psychologists have studied
these concerns and have proposed a number of theories that try to
explain people's justice concerns.
Early social psychological theories of social justice—such as
equity theory (e.g., Adams, 1965) and other related conceptions of
justice (e.g., Blau, 1964; Homans, 1961; Stouffer, Suchman,
DeVinney, Star, & Williams, 1949)—are commonly referred to as
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theories of distributive justice because they focus on the outcomes
that people receive. Some conceptions of distributive justice state
that outcomes are crucial in the fairness judgment process. For
example, it has been argued that experiencing unfavorable out-
comes is a necessary precondition before people start thinking
about social justice issues (Rutte & Messick, 1995; see also Lerner
& Whitehead, 1980).
Another conception of justice emerged from the innovative
work by Thibaut and Walker (1975). These authors argued that the
outcome of a court trial and the manner in which the trial is
conducted form two separable aspects of legal settings that can
affect litigants' fairness judgments. Thibaut and Walker and their
co-researchers showed that social justice concerns indeed include
questions about the fairness of procedures as well as questions
about the fairness of outcomes. More specifically, the research
findings by Thibaut, Walker, and colleagues indicated that having
control over the outcome of a court trial (decision control) and
having control over the manner in which the trial is conducted
(process control) have independent effects on litigants' reactions
(see, e.g., Houlden, LaTour, Walker, & Thibaut, 1978; LaTour,
Houlden, Walker, & Thibaut, 1976; Lind, Kurtz, Musante, Walker,
& Thibaut, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Walker, LaTour, Lind,
& Thibaut, 1974). Since Thibaut and Walker's (1975) research,
numerous articles, books, and research studies have shown that
perceived procedural justice can strongly affect people's beliefs,
feelings, attitudes, and behaviors (see, e.g., Cropanzano & Green-
berg, 1997; Folger & Konovsky, 1989; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler
& Lind, 1992).
A crucial concept in Thibaut and Walker's (1975) work was
whether or not a procedure allowed people (some) control over the
process. In the pioneering research by Folger and colleagues (e.g.,
Folger, 1977; Folger, Rosenfield, Grove, & Corkran, 1979), the
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2001. Vol. 81, No. 4, 616-626
Copyright 2001 by Ihe American Psychological Association. Inc. 0O22-3514/0I/S5.0O DOI: I0.1037//0022-3514.81.4.616
616
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VOICE 617
focus shifted from the concept of process control toward investi-
gating whether or not people receive an opportunity to voice their
opinion in the decision-making process. The concept of voice is
very important in the field of procedural justice, partly because
research convincingly has shown that voice is one of the key
determinants that lead people to judge a particular procedure as
fair or unfair (depending on whether voice opportunities are or are
not allowed). The concept of voice is also important because
studies have revealed that voice incorporates both instrumental and
noninstrumental aspects. That is, Lind, Kanfer, and Earley (1990)
varied whether participants in a goal-setting situation were allowed
an opportunity to voice their opinions before the goal was set, after
the goal was set, or not at all. As predicted, both pre- and postde-
cision voice led to higher fairness judgments than no voice did,
with predecision voice leading to higher fairness judgments than
postdecision voice. Research on voice effects thus has revealed
that not only instrumental considerations are important in the
psychology of social justice (cf. Thibaut & Walker, 1975) but
noninstrumental concerns are as well (Lind et al., 1990). These and
other findings have led to the situation that experiments on pro-
cedural justice nowadays typically do not vary process control (cf.
Thibaut & Walker, 1975), but instead manipulate whether partic-
ipants are or are not allowed voice. In fact, varying whether or not
people have an opportunity to voice their opinion is now the most
generally accepted manipulation of procedure (Brockner et al.,
1998; Lind et al., 1990; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Van den Bos, 1999;
Van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1996). Thus, voice is central to
the canon of procedural justice studies and has removed the field
of social justice from a purely instrumental orientation to a per-
spective that incorporates both instrumental and noninstrumental
aspects of justice concerns.
A large number of studies, conducted in natural settings as well
as in the laboratory, have found that being allowed voice, as
opposed to no voice, leads to more positive reactions, such as
enhanced perceived procedural justice (Lind & Tyler, 1988) and
less negative affect (e.g., anger against officials; Tyler, 1987).
Following Folger and colleagues' work (e.g., Folger, 1977; Folger
et al., 1979), this finding is usually labeled the voice effect. It has
been concluded that the voice effect is one of the most important
and robust findings in the domain of procedural justice and in the
field of social psychology (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1987; Tyler
& Lind, 1992; Van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997).
Moreover, research on the voice effect has been so successful that
it has been argued that the field is waiting for theories that explain
the psychology of this phenomenon (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988).
In the present article, we try to offer an explanation by arguing
that how people react to voice and no-voice procedures depends on
their reference points (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). This is an
issue that, according to our knowledge, has not been explored
before and that is important because, from major theoretical treat-
ments of classic social psychology (e.g., Adams, 1965; Blau, 1964;
Folger, 1986; Homans, 1961; Stouffer et al., 1949; Thibaut &
Kelley, 1959), it can be deduced that when people are forming
fairness judgments they do so by referring to reference points. For
instance, in the relative deprivation literature (e.g., Stouffer et al.,
1949; see also Cropanzano & Randall, 1995; Folger & Martin,
1986; Folger, Rosenfield, Rheaume, & Martin, 1983; Folger,
Rosenfield, & Robinson, 1983), it has been argued that outcome
improvement may be a source of rising expectations. These rising
expectations may serve as a reference point such that when ex-
pectations are violated by improvements that fail to rise at the
same rate, people may be dissatisfied with their improved out-
comes. To give another example, equity theory (e.g., Adams,
1965) argues that outcomes are evaluated in terms of where own
outcomes fall relative to the outcomes of others. Outcomes of
comparison others constitute reference points in that own out-
comes are judged to be more fair when they are equal to, as
opposed to different from, outcomes of comparison others.
We argue here that these and other examples (see, e.g., Blau,
1964; Homans, 1961; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) suggest that insight
into the role of reference points is essential for understanding the
psychology of voice. In the current article, we try to show that the
psychology of voice depends in large part on people's reference
points by focusing on Referent Cognitions Theory (RCT; Cropan-
zano & Folger, 1989; Folger, 1986, 1987, 1993; see also Folger &
Cropanzano, 1998, 2001). RCT is an important theory for the
current purposes because, within the justice domain, it is probably
the most recent and most thorough framework dealing with refer-
ence points. We argue, however, that thus far RCT has not been
used to explain the psychology of voice. Furthermore, we point out
that important methodological issues of the previous RCT studies
have to be dealt with, and we try to deal with these issues in the
research presented in this article. Below we give a short introduc-
tion to RCT, after which we derive the purposes of the current
research.
Referent Cognitions Theory
RCT was developed in the 1980s. In the course of time, different
versions of RCT have been developed (for overviews, see Cro-
panzano & Folger, 1989; Folger, 1986, 1987, 1993; see also Folger
& Cropanzano, 1998, 2001; Folger & Kass, 2000), but these
versions all share an important core principle with respect to the
psychology of social justice: Following the work by Kahneman
and Tversky (1982), RCT argues that people's reactions to proce-
dural and distributive justice depend largely on their counterfactual
thoughts. In essence, RCT reasons that when a distributive or
procedural rule is broken people's thinking becomes inherently
referential: People use a frame of reference for evaluating what
happened that consists of a mental comparison to what might have
happened instead (for more elaborate introductions to RCT, see
Cropanzano & Folger, 1989; Folger, 1986, 1987, 1993; Folger &
Cropanzano, 1998, 2001; Folger & Kass, 2000). Although an
elaborate overview of the empirical work on RCT is beyond the
scope of this article (for more complete descriptions, see, e.g.,
Cropanzano & Folger, 1989; Folger, 1986, 1987, 1993; Folger &
Cropanzano, 1998, 2001; Folger, Rosenfield, Rheaume, & Martin,
1983), we discuss three classic RCT studies that are most closely
related to the psychology of voice: Cropanzano and Folger (1989),
Folger and Martin (1986), and Folger, Rosenfield, and Robinson
(1983).
In these studies, all participants received an unfavorable out-
come (i.e., they all failed to obtain a bonus of extra course credit).
In each study, participants were made aware of the outcomes they
would have obtained if things would have been different. That is,
participants in the high-referent outcome conditions were led to
believe that there was an alternative situation in which they would
have received the favorable outcome (viz. the bonus). Participants
618 VAN DEN BOS AND VAN PROOIJEN
in the low-referent outcome conditions were informed that they
would not have obtained the favorable outcome in either case. The
manipulation of procedure in the studies by Folger and Martin
(1986) and Folger, Rosenfield, and Robinson (1983) varied
whether participants were given good reasons (high-justification
conditions) or poor reasons (low-justification conditions) for why
they failed to obtain the bonus. The procedure manipulation in the
experiment by Cropanzano and Folger (1989) was such that par-
ticipants were allowed (participant-decision condition) versus not
allowed (experimenter-decision condition) to decide which of two
types of tasks would be the task with which—depending on their
performance on the task—they would have an opportunity to
obtain the bonus. Findings of these studies indicated Outcome X
Procedure interactions such that participants showed the highest
levels of negative reactions (e.g., resentment and discontent) when
high-referent outcomes were combined with bad procedures (viz.
poor justifications in Folger & Martin, 1986, and Folger, Rosen-
field, & Robinson, 1983, and experimenter-decision conditions in
Cropanzano & Folger, 1989).
The Current Research
We argue here that RCT can be extended in three important
ways. That is, we scrutinize below the operationalizations used in
previous RCT studies and reason that by operationalizing (a) the
procedure manipulation and (b) the referent manipulation in dif-
ferent ways than was done in previous RCT studies and (c) by not
giving participants unfavorable outcomes, insights into the psy-
chology of procedural justice and voice will be enlarged
considerably.
The first way of extending RCT that we propose has to do with
the manipulation of procedure used in previous RCT studies. More
specifically, as has been argued by Bies (1987) and acknowledged
by Cropanzano and Folger (1989), the justification conditions in
the studies by Folger and Martin (1986) and Folger, Rosenfield,
and Robinson (1983) differed in terms of the social accounts
provided by the experimenter. As a consequence, the results of
these studies "do not bear directly on the effects of different
decision-making procedures per se but instead on the effects of
different degrees of explanation for a decision" (Cropanzano &
Folger, 1989, p. 294). In the experiment by Cropanzano and Folger
(1989), procedure was operationalized by varying whether partic-
ipants were allowed to decide which task they could complete. We
argue here that it can be disputed whether this is a manipulation of
procedure rather than a manipulation of decision control (cf.
Thibaut & Walker, 1975): Although the Cropanzano and Folger
study did not manipulate whether participants had control over the
final decision (viz. whether to give participants the bonus), their
procedure manipulation clearly varied the amount of decision
control participants experienced (participants or the experimenter
decided which task was completed). Furthermore, even if process
control as opposed to decision control was manipulated in the
Cropanzano and Folger study, it can be concluded that voice
procedures have never been studied in previous RCT studies.
Studies conducted by Ambrose, Harland, and Kulik (1991) and
Grienberger, Rutte, and Van Knippenberg (1997) manipulated
procedure in similar ways as Cropanzano and Folger (1989) did. In
addition to this, the Ambrose et al. and Grienberger et al. studies
included a referent control manipulation: It was varied whether
another participant was or was not allowed to decide which task to
complete. Thus, none of the various RCT studies ever manipulated
procedure, per se, prior to the studies by Cropanzano and Folger,
Ambrose et al., and Grienberger et al. Moreover, even in those
cases, the manipulations of procedure involved perceived control
as "choice" rather than the procedural element of "voice" that is
both more central to the canon of procedural justice studies as well
as more removed from a purely instrumental interpretation. This
lack of evidence regarding voice procedures is unfortunate given
the potential value of RCT for the psychology of the voice effect.
As a result, we do not know RCT's contribution to our under-
standing of one of the most important phenomena, if not the most
important phenomenon, in the procedural justice domain: the voice
effect. In the studies presented in this article, therefore, we opera-
tionalized procedure by varying whether participants were or were
not allowed an opportunity to voice their opinion.
The second way in which we extend RCT involves the referent
manipulation used in previous RCT studies. This manipulation is
a crucial element in RCT's empirical work, making the theory
significantly different from other justice theories. It should be
noted here, however, that in previous studies this manipulation was
induced by varying the ease with which participants could think of
having obtained a better outcome than the outcome they actually
got (see, e.g., the referent outcome manipulations in the studies by
Cropanzano & Folger, 1989; Folger & Martin, 1986; Folger,
Rosenfield, & Robinson, 1983) or a better procedure than they
actually got (see, e.g., the referent control manipulations in the
experiments by Ambrose et al., 1991, and Grienberger et al.,
1997). Thus, the referent manipulation was induced by referring to
outcome or procedure information. This suggests that referent
manipulations should be induced by making reference to justice-
related information (e.g., outcome or procedure information). We
propose here, however, that reference points can be manipulated
without referring to justice-related information. In other words, we
argue that referent manipulations do not have to be confounded
with justice-related information and that independently varying
justice-unrelated reference points and justice-related information
may strongly enhance the significance of RCT for the psychology
of social justice.
For our manipulation of reference point, we go back to the roots
of RCT: the work by Kahneman and Tversky (1982). These
authors informed participants that two men, Crane and Tees, both
missed their airplane flight. Closeness of reference point was
induced by varying the time with which flights were missed: Crane
had missed his flight by 30 min whereas Tees's flight took off
just 5 min before he arrived at the airport. As predicted, the
majority of participants (96%) thought that Tees would be more
upset about missing his flight. Kahneman and Tversky argued that
this was because the psychological distance between the actual
situation of missing the flight and the simulated or referent situa-
tion of making the flight was smaller for Tees than for Crane.
In the current study, we varied whether participants were con-
fronted with close or distant reference points. It is important to
note here that participants in the Kahneman and Tversky (1982)
study were not explicitly told what antecedents should have been
different before Tees would have gotten on his flight. Thus,
whereas participants in the high-referent conditions of previous
RCT studies were explicitly told that if a different decision had
been made they would have obtained a better outcome or proce-
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dure, the classic manipulation by Kahneman and Tversky sug-
gested that we did not have to explicitly inform participants in our
close-reference-point conditions that an alternative situation would
have yielded a different procedure or a different outcome. In other
words, this implied that we could confidently manipulate closeness
of reference points without explicitly referring to justice-related
information (e.g., information about procedures or outcomes).
On the basis of the above-presented line of reasoning, we
orthogonally manipulated reference point (close vs. distant) and
procedure (voice vs. no voice) in the studies presented here. The
concrete operationalizations are explained below, but for now we
note that this design allowed us to investigate effects of procedure
without giving participants information about outcome. This is
important, we argue, because the previous empirical RCT work
has been strongly outcome oriented. Besides the above-mentioned
manipulation of procedure by means of choice (Cropanzano &
Folger, 1989; cf. Ambrose et al, 1991; Grienberger et al., 1997)
and the confound of referent manipulations and outcome informa-
tion (e.g., Cropanzano & Folger, 1989; Folger & Martin, 1986;
Folger, Rosenfield, & Robinson, 1983), this orientation is illus-
trated by the fact that all participants in the studies by Cropanzano
and Folger (1989), Folger and Martin (1986), and Folger, Rosen-
field, and Robinson (1983) received an unfavorable outcome (viz.
failed to obtain the bonus).
The third way in which we go beyond the previous RCT studies
is by not giving participants unfavorable outcomes. This is impor-
tant because the fact that participants in all the previous RCT
studies were given unfavorable outcomes suggests that in the
previous studies it was assumed (perhaps implicitly) that experi-
encing unfavorable outcomes is a necessary condition before peo-
ple start thinking about social justice issues. As was noted before,
this assumption has been explicitly made in outcome-oriented
articles on social justice (e.g., Rutte & Messick, 1995). However,
we argue here that this distributive orientation is not an essential
part of RCT's theorizing and hence—following Ockham's razor,
which dictates that scientists should be as parsimonious as they
can—should not constitute a crucial element in RCT's empirical
work.
Experiment 1
A central element in RCT is that people compare what actually
happened to what might have happened instead. This suggests that
when alternative situations are clearly available it should be easier
to imagine that something else could have happened than when
alternatives are less clearly available. We used this to set up the
reference point manipulation of Experiment 1.
Participants in Experiment 1 read and responded to stimulus
information manipulated by means of scenarios. In these scenarios,
participants were asked to imagine that they were members of a
group of people (the blue team). Participants in the voice condition
were informed that members of the blue team received an oppor-
tunity to voice their opinions about a decision that had to be made,
and participants in the no-voice condition were told that members
of the blue team did not receive such an opportunity. By means of
the reference-point manipulation, we made it easier for participants
in the close-reference-point condition to imagine that something
else could have happened than for those in the distant-reference-
point condition: In the close-reference-point condition, we in-
formed participants that they had until recently been a member of
a different group (the red team). In the distant-reference-point
condition, participants were not told that they had been members
of a different team. Following the above-presented line of reason-
ing, we argued that when a clear alternative situation is available
(still being a member of the red team) it is easier for participants
to imagine that something else could have happened (if only they
would still have been a member of the red team) than in the
distant-reference-point condition (in which there is no alternative
previous group membership). As a consequence, we predicted that,
following the RCT framework, procedure would more strongly
affect reactions of participants in the close-reference-point condi-
tion than those in the distant-reference-point condition. More spe-
cifically, because RCT argues that particularly when a fairness rule
is broken people's thinking becomes inherently referential, and
because counterfactual thinking is stronger when people have
received negative as opposed to positive information (e.g., Land-
man, 1987; Zeelenberg, Van den Bos, Van Dijk, & Pieters, in
press; see also Folger & Kass, 2000; Olson, Buhrmann, & Roese,
2000), we expected that particularly in the no-voice conditions,
participants' reactions would be affected by the manipulation of
reference point.
Because it is important to measure affective elements in peo-
ple's responses (Tyler & Smith, 1998; Van den Bos & Miedema,
2000; Vermunt, Wit, Van den Bos, & Lind, 1996; Weiss, Suckow,
& Cropanzano, 1999), and because both Kahneman and Tversky
(1982) and RCT studies have focused on negative affect (Folger &
Cropanzano, 1998), the main dependent variables in Experiment 1
were participants' negative affective reactions to their procedure.
Method
Participants and design. Sixty students (17 men and 43 women) at
Leiden University participated in the experiment and were paid for their
participation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the conditions
of the 2 (procedure: voice vs. no voice) X 2 (reference point: close vs.
distant) factorial design. The design was balanced with 15 participants
assigned to each of the four conditions.
Experimental procedure. Participants read the scenario and answered
the questions that constituted the dependent variables after participating in
two other, unrelated experiments. The experiments lasted a total of 1 hr,
and participants were paid 10 Dutch guilders (1 Dutch guilder equaled
approximately $0.50 U.S. at the time the studies in this article were
conducted). On arrival at the laboratory, participants were led to separate
cubicles, each of which contained a computer with a monitor and a
keyboard. The computers were used to present the stimulus information
and to measure the dependent variables.
First, participants were asked to imagine the following situation:
You work in an organization. In this organization, people work
together in teams. There are 5 teams within the organization. These
teams are described by means of colors: the red team, the blue team,
the yellow team, the green team, and the orange team. Because the
organization has performed well, it is announced that a bonus
of 10,000 Dutch guilders will be distributed among all employees. A
certain amount of money has been allocated to your team. The
management of the organization has to decide how this amount of
money will be distributed.
This was followed by the manipulation of reference point. Participants in
the close-reference-point condition read the following sentence: "Yester-
day morning you were a member of a different team, the red team, but
620 VAN DEN BOS AND VAN PROOIJEN
since yesterday afternoon you are a member of the blue team." Participants
in the distant-reference-point condition read the following: "You are a
member of the blue team."
This was followed by the manipulation of procedure.1 Participants in the
voice condition read the following two sentences: "The management has
decided to give voice to the members of the blue team: The members of the
blue team may give their opinion about how the money should be distrib-
uted." Participants in the no-voice condition read the following statement:
"The management has decided to give no voice to the members of the blue
team: The members of the blue team may not give their opinion about how
the money should be distributed."
After participants had read the scenario, they were asked questions
pertaining to the dependent variables. Following Van den Bos and Spruijt
(in press), we asked participants of Experiment 1 for their negative affec-
tive reactions to their procedure by asking them on 7-point scales to what
extent they were angry (1 = not at all angry, 7 = very angry), furious (1 =
not at all furious, 7 = very furious), disappointed (1 = not at all disap-
pointed. 7 = very disappointed), and sad (1 = not at all sad, 7 = very sad)
about the way they were treated. Participants' answers on these four
questions were averaged to form a reliable index of negative procedural
affect (a = .89). When the participants had answered these questions, they
were thoroughly debriefed, paid, and thanked for their participation.
Results
The means and standard deviations of the negative procedural
affect scale of Experiment 1 are presented in Table 1. A 2 (pro-
cedure) X 2 (reference point) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on
this scale showed only a main effect of procedure, F(\, 56) =
106.42, p < .001, and an interaction effect, F(l, 56) = 5.56, p <
.03. The main effect of procedure indicated that participants who
received an opportunity to voice their opinion were less negative
about the procedure than participants who received no such op-
portunity were. More important, however, the interaction effect
showed that the effect of procedure was stronger in the close-
reference-point condition, F(l, 56) = 80.33, p < .001, if = .59,
than in the distant-reference-point condition, F(l, 56) = 31.66,
p < .001, rf = .36. In further correspondence with what was
expected, the results show that the difference between the close-
and distant-reference-point conditions was stronger in the no-voice
condition, F(l, 56) = 5.25, p < .03, than in the voice condition,
F(\, 56) = 1.09, ns.
Discussion
The findings of Experiment 1 support our line of reasoning:
When it is easier for people to imagine that something else could
Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations of Ratings of Negative
Procedural Affect as a Function of Procedure and Reference
Point (Experiment 1)
Reference point
Close Distant
Procedure
Voice
No voice
M
1.6
4.6
SD
0.8
0.9
M
2.0
3.8
SD
1.0
0.9
have happened (e.g., because they have until recently been a
member of a different group) their reactions are more affected by
manipulations of procedure than when it is less easy to imagine
something else could have happened (e.g., because there is no
previous group). In other words, when people are confronted with
a close reference point, they are more affected by variations in
procedure than are participants who have been subjected to a
distant reference point. In further correspondence with what was
predicted, especially strong effects of reference point were found
when people did not get an opportunity to voice their opinion.
Before strong conclusions could be drawn on the basis of these
findings, however, it was important to replicate them in a second
experiment.
Experiment 2
Participants in Experiment 1 read a scenario and responded to
this hypothetical situation. One might wonder whether similar
results would be obtained if participants were exposed to a situa-
tion in which they directly experienced a procedure and a reference
point. As a second test of our predictions, therefore, the same
independent variables were manipulated in such an experiment. To
rule out alternative explanations for the findings of Experiment 1,
we used a different operationalization of reference point in Exper-
iment 2. We derived this manipulation from the time manipulation
in the Kahneman and Tversky (1982) study, in which stimulus
persons just (close reference point) or clearly (distant reference
point) missed their flights.
In Experiment 2, all participants were informed that they were
assigned to one of two groups. Furthermore, participants in the
voice condition were informed that members of their group re-
ceived an opportunity to voice their opinions, and participants in
the no-voice condition were told that members of their group did
not receive such an opportunity. In the close-reference-point con-
dition, participants were assigned to their group just before the
procedure manipulation was induced. In the distant-reference-
point condition, participants were assigned to their group at the
beginning of the experiment. We reasoned that participants in the
close-reference-point condition (who just had been assigned to
their group) would find it easier to imagine that something else
could have happened (if only group assignment would have turned
out differently) than participants in the distant-reference-point
condition (who had been assigned to their group quite a while ago).
Therefore, following the RCT framework, we predicted that pro-
cedure would more strongly affect participants' reactions in the
close- as opposed to the distant-reference-point conditions. We
further expected, following the line of reasoning presented in the
introduction of Experiment 1, that participants' reactions would be
affected by the manipulation of reference point particularly in the
no-voice conditions.
Because we wanted to present data on various human reactions
and because justice judgments are typically measured in studies on
Note. Means are on 7-point scales, with higher values indicating higher
ratings of negative procedural affect.
' In the experiments presented here we did not inform participants about
the reasons why events happened. This was done because, as argued
earlier, we wanted to manipulate voice versus no-voice procedures rather
than justifications, being the manipulation of procedure used in previous
RCT studies (Folger & Martin, 1986; Folger, Rosenfield, & Robinson,
1983).
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social justice and are important in RCT (Cropanzano & Folger,
1989; Folger & Martin, 1986; Folger, Rosenfield, Rheaume, &
Martin, 1983; Folger, Rosenfield, & Robinson, 1983), the main
dependent variables in Experiment 2 were participants' judgments
of procedural justice.
It has been argued extensively that people use frames of refer-
ence when forming justice judgments (e.g., Adams, 1965; Blau,
1964; Folger, 1986; Homans, 1961; Stouffer et al., 1949; Thibaut
& Kelley, 1959). The manipulation of reference point was in-
tended to make frames of reference more cognitively available in
the close-reference-point condition than in the distant-reference-
point condition. By means of the reference-point manipulation, we
therefore tried to establish that participants in the close-reference-
point condition would find it easier and hence would need less
time to form procedure judgments than participants in the distant-
reference-point condition would. As a check on the manipulation
of reference point, therefore, the time participants needed to an-
swer the procedural justice judgments was measured.
Method
Participants and design. Eighty-eight students (40 men and 48
women) at Leiden University participated in the experiment and were paid
for their participation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the
conditions of the 2 (procedure: voice vs. no voice) X 2 (reference point:
close vs. distant) factorial design. The design was balanced, with 22
participants assigned to each of the four conditions.
Experimental procedure. Participants were invited to the laboratory to
participate in a study on how people perform tasks. On arrival at the
laboratory, participants were led to separate cubicles, each of which con-
tained a computer with a monitor and a keyboard. Participants were told
that the computers were connected to one another and that the experimenter
could communicate with them by means of the computer network. The
computers were used to present the stimulus information and collect data
on the dependent variables and the manipulation checks. Participants
participated in the experiment before participating in another, unrelated
experiment. The experiments lasted a total of 1.5 hr, and participants were
paid 15 Dutch guilders.
In the first part of the instructions, the experimental procedure was
outlined to the participants: After the experimental tasks were explained,
participants would practice the tasks for 2 min, after which time they would
work on the tasks for 10 min in a first work round and for 20 min in a
second work round. All participants were then informed that this study
consisted of two substudies, which they were told were different, yet
comparable with each other in several aspects. Participants were further
told, by means of the computer network, that at some point in the study
they would be assigned to one of the two substudies. (In reality, however,
all stimulus information was preprogrammed, a procedure to which none of
the participants objected on debriefing.) Participants in the distant-
reference-point condition were then informed that they were assigned to
the second substudy.
The task was then explained to the participants. Figures would be
presented on the upper right part of the computer screen. Each figure
consisted of 36 squares, and each square showed one of eight distinct
patterns. On the upper left side of the computer screen, one of the eight
patterns would be presented, and participants had to count the number of
squares with this pattern in the figure on the right side of the screen. When
participants indicated the correct number of patterns in the figure on the
right side of the screen, another figure and another pattern would be
presented on the screen. In the practice and work rounds, the number of
tasks that the participant had completed (i.e., the number of figures that the
participant had counted) in the present round were presented on the lower
right side of the screen. On the lower left side of the screen, the time
remaining in the present round was shown. The practice round then began,
after which the first work round began. After the first work round had
ended, participants were told how many tasks they had completed in this
round. Participants in the close-reference-point condition were then in-
formed that they were assigned to the second substudy.
The procedure that participants received was then manipulated.2 In the
voice condition, the experimenter told participants (by means of the com-
puter network; cf. Lind et al., 1990; Van den Bos & Spruijt, in press; Van
den Bos et al., 1996):
I have decided that participants of the second substudy will receive an
opportunity to voice their opinion about the number of tasks they
should perform in the second work round and will be asked to type in
their opinion about the number of tasks they should perform in the
second work round. So please type in the number of tasks that you
think you should perform in the second work round.
In the no-voice condition, the experimenter told participants:
I have decided that participants of the second substudy will not
receive an opportunity to voice their opinion about the number of
tasks they should perform in the second work round and that they will
not be asked to type their opinion about the number of tasks they
should perform in the second work round. So you will not be asked to
type in the number of tasks that you think you should perform in the
second work round.
Participants were then asked questions pertaining to the dependent
variables and the manipulation checks. Following Van den Bos (1999), we
solicited procedural justice judgments by asking participants how just (1 =
very unjust, 1 = very just), fair (1 = very unfair, 1 = very fair), and
appropriate (1 — very inappropriate,! — very appropriate) they judged the
way in which they were treated. Participants' answers on these three
questions were averaged to form a reliable index of procedural justice
judgments (a = .94). By means of the manipulation of reference point, we
tried to establish that participants in the close-reference-point condition
would find it easier and hence would need less time to form their procedure
judgments than participants in the distant-reference-point condition did. As
a check on the manipulation of reference point, therefore, we measured the
time participants needed to answer the three procedure judgments of
Experiment 2 with the computers. Because the distributions of response
latencies generally were positively skewed, we applied logarithmic trans-
formations. Participants' transformed response latencies were averaged to
form a reliable scale of their response latencies (a = ,79).3 To check
whether the procedure had been perceived as intended, we asked partici-
pants to what extent they agreed with the statement that they had been
given an opportunity to voice their opinion about the number of tasks they
should perform in the second work round (1 = strongly disagree, 1 =
strongly agree) and to what extent they agreed with the statement that they
had not been given an opportunity to voice their opinion about the number
of tasks they should perform in the second work round (1 = strongly
disagree, 1 = strongly agree). To further validate the manipulation of
procedure (cf. Tyler, 1987), participants' perceptions of due consideration
2
 Reference point was manipulated in Experiment 2 by varying the time
of telling people their group membership. It is important to note here that,
in all conditions of Experiment 2, reference point was manipulated before
the procedure manipulation was induced. Thus, order of manipulations (cf.
Van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997) cannot explain the findings
reported here.
1
 Analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted on this scale of
transformed response latencies. To make interpretation of the ANOVA
effects easier and more understandable, we present the relevant means and
standard deviations in seconds, and not in logarithmically transformed
values.
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were solicited: Participants were asked to what extent the experimenter had
paid attention to their opinions (1 = very weak, 1 = very strong). When the
participants had answered these questions, they were told that the second
work round was cancelled, after which they were thoroughly debriefed,
paid, and thanked for their participation.
Results
Manipulation checks. A 2 X 2 multivariate analysis of vari-
ance (MANOVA) on the two manipulation checks of procedure
(the voice check and the no-voice check) yielded only main effects
of procedure at both the multivariate level and the univariate
levels: multivariate F(2, 83) = 136.98, p < .001; for the voice
check, F(l, 84) = 276.55, p < .001; for the no-voice check, F(l,
84) = 135.84, p < .001. Participants in the voice condition agreed
more with the statement that they had received an opportunity to
voice their opinion (M = 6.0, SD = 1.3) than did participants in
the no-voice condition (M = 1.6, SD = 1.2). Participants in the
no-voice condition agreed more with the statement that they had
not received an opportunity to voice their opinion (M = 5.8,
SD = 1.8) than did participants in the voice condition (M = 1.8,
SD — 1.4). It can be concluded that the procedure manipulation
was successfully operationalized and was induced independently
of the manipulation of reference point.
A 2 X 2 ANOVA on participants' perceptions of due consid-
eration showed only a main effect of procedure, F(l, 84) = 82.77,
p < .001. Participants in the voice condition believed the experi-
menter had paid more attention to their opinions (M = 4.3,
SD = 1.6) than participants in the no-voice condition did
(M = 1.5, SD = 1.2). This yields corroborative evidence that the
manipulation of procedure was successfully operationalized and
was induced independently of the reference-point manipulation.
By means of the manipulation of reference point, we tried to
establish that participants in the close-reference-point condition
found it easier and hence needed less time to form their procedure
judgments than participants in the distant-reference-point condi-
tion did. In correspondence with this, a 2 X 2 ANOVA on the
response latencies scale showed only a main effect of reference
point, F(l, 84) = 12.57, p < .01. As expected, participants in the
close-reference-point condition needed less time to respond to the
procedure judgments questions (M = 7.0 s, SD = 4.4) than
participants in the distant-reference-point condition did
(M = 10.3 s, SD = 7.7). It can be concluded that the manipulation
of reference point was successful in establishing the effects on
participants' response latencies that we intended with this
manipulation.
Additional variables. The number of tasks that participants
completed in the practice round and the number completed in the
first work round were subjected to a 2 X 2 MANOVA. This
yielded no significant effects at either the multivariate level or the
univariate levels. Independent of conditions, participants com-
pleted the same number of tasks in the practice round (M = 2 1 ,
SD = 6.2) and completed the same number of tasks in the first
work round (M = 128, SD = 27.7).
Participants who were allowed voice (n = 44) typed in their
opinion about the number of tasks they should perform in the
second work round. As expected, a one-way ANOVA yielded no
significant effect of reference point. Independent of reference
point, participants thought they should perform the same number
of tasks in the second work round (M = 229, SD = 62.0). It can
be concluded that the manipulation of reference point had no
unintended effects on participants' performance in the practice and
first work rounds and on their voiced opinions.
Procedural justice judgments. The means and standard devi-
ations of the procedural justice scale of Experiment 2 are presented
in Table 2. A 2 X 2 ANOVA on this scale yielded only a main
effect of procedure, F(l, 84) = 20.06, p < .001, and an interaction
effect, F(l, 84) = 4.57, p < .04. The main effect of procedure
showed that participants who received an opportunity to voice
their opinion judged their procedure to be more just than did
participants who received no voice opportunity. More interesting,
however, was that the interaction effect showed that the effect of
procedure was stronger in the close- than in the distant-reference-
point conditions. In fact, in the close-reference-point condition,
participants who received an opportunity to voice their opinion
were significantly more positive about the way they were treated
than were participants who received no such opportunity, F(l,
84) = 21.88, p < .001, whereas in the distant-reference-point
condition, participants' judgments showed a similar but not statis-
tically significant effect of procedure, F(l, 84) = 2.74, p < .12. In
further correspondence with what was expected, the results show
that the difference between the close and distant conditions was
stronger in the no-voice condition, F(l, 84) = 7.24, p < .01, than
in the voice condition, F < 1.
Discussion
The findings of Experiment 2 are supportive for our line of
reasoning: When it is relatively easy for people to imagine that
something else could have happened (e.g., if only group assign-
ment, which has just happened, would have turned out differently)
their justice judgments are more affected by manipulations of
procedure than when it is less easy to imagine something else
could have happened (e.g., because group assignment has hap-
pened quite a while ago). This suggests that when people are
confronted with close reference points their perceptions of proce-
dural justice are more affected by variations in procedure than
when they are subjected to distant reference points. In further
correspondence with our hypotheses, especially strong effects of
reference point were found when people did not get an opportunity
to voice their opinion.
Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations of Procedural Justice
Judgments as a Function of Procedure and Reference Point
(Experiment 2)
Procedure
Voice
No voice
M
5.5
3.8
Close
Reference
SD
1.3
1.1
point
M
5.4
4.8
Distant
SD
1.1
1.4
Note. Means are on 7-point scales, with higher values indicating higher
ratings of procedural justice.
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General Discussion
Taken together, the findings of our two experiments suggest that
people react more strongly to voice versus no-voice procedures
when they have close as opposed to distant reference points. These
findings were found using different manipulations of reference
point. This is important because each manipulation of reference
point was designed to rule out alternative explanations of the other
reference-point manipulation. The fact that we obtained similar
results in both experiments suggests that the effects reported are
robust and are not contingent on details of the manipulations used
here. Robustness is also indicated by the fact that we obtained
similar findings when people reacted to a hypothetical procedure
and reference point (Experiment 1) and when they directly expe-
rienced a procedure and reference point (Experiment 2), and when
judgments of negative procedural affect (Experiment 1) and pro-
cedural justice (Experiment 2) served as dependent variables.
Furthermore, because RCT argues that particularly when a fairness
rule is broken people's thinking becomes inherently referential,
and because counterfactual thinking is stronger when people have
received negative as opposed to positive information (e.g., Land-
man, 1987; Zeelenberg et al, in press; see also Folger & Kass,
2000; Olson et al., 2000), we expected that especially in the
no-voice conditions participants' reactions would be affected by
the manipulation of reference point. The findings of our two
experiments are in correspondence with this prediction in that in
both experiments the strongest effects of reference point on pro-
cedure judgments were found in the no-voice conditions.
Main dependent variables in Experiments 1 and 2 were ratings
of negative procedural affect and procedural justice, respectively.
These dependent variables were measured because both have a
prominent role in the literatures on social justice in general (see,
e.g., Tyler & Smith, 1998; Van den Bos & Miedema, 2000;
Vermunt et al., 1996; Weiss et al., 1999) and RCT in particular
(see, e.g., Cropanzano & Folger, 1989; Folger & Cropanzano,
1998; Folger & Martin, 1986; Folger, Rosenfield, Rheaume, &
Martin, 1983; Folger, Rosenfield, & Robinson, 1983). The fact that
we have obtained supportive evidence for our hypotheses on both
types of dependent variables increases confidence in our findings
and indicates that RCT can be used to predict and explain both
people's affective reactions and their justice judgments.4
By means of the procedure manipulation, we tried to ensure that
participants believed they either received or did not receive an
opportunity to voice their opinions and that this manipulation of
procedure would be independent of the reference-point manipula-
tion. Both manipulation-check findings and perceptions of due
consideration that were assessed in Experiment 2 showed that the
manipulation of procedure was induced as intended and was ma-
nipulated independently of the reference-point manipulation. Thus,
participants in both close- and distant-reference-point conditions
perceived the procedure manipulation as intended.
By means of the manipulation of reference point, we tried to
establish that participants in the close-reference-point conditions
would find it easier to form procedure judgments than participants
in the distant-reference-point conditions did. We therefore rea-
soned that participants in the close-reference-point conditions
would need less time to construct procedure judgments than would
those in the distant-reference-point conditions. The manipulation-
check findings presented in Experiment 2 suggested that partici-
pants indeed needed less time to give their procedure judgments in
the close- as opposed to the distant-reference-point conditions.
Thus, the manipulation of reference point was successful in affect-
ing participants' response latencies in ways that were intended
with this manipulation. This suggests that the manipulation of
reference point was successfully operationalized. These are impor-
tant findings, we think, because both the justice literature (see, e.g.,
Van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997) and the literature on
counterfactual thinking (see, e.g., Zeelenberg et al., 1998) typically
do not provide data on the processes they are talking about.
Furthermore, assessing participants' response latencies by means
of computers is a nice, inconspicuous way to get at the psycho-
logical processes researchers are interested in, without any chance
that this will affect these processes (cf. Folger & Cropanzano,
2001).
It should be noted here, however, that it was conceivable that
participants' response latencies could be affected by the procedure
or the combination of procedure and reference point that partici-
pants experienced. Such effects, however, were not observed here,
and in fact typically are not found in procedural justice experi-
ments. This may have to do with the difficulty of reliably assessing
people's response latencies and/or with the psychological expla-
nations that RCT proposes. What the present findings do show,
however, is that response latencies were affected by the manipu-
lation of reference point in ways we intended with this manipula-
tion, and that procedure judgments were affected by the combina-
tion of reference point and procedure in ways that were predicted
by the RCT framework. We hope that the present findings may
serve as a starting point for future justice studies to tap more
directly the processes they are interested in.
Whereas participants in the high-referent conditions of previous
RCT studies (Cropanzano & Folger, 1989; Folger & Martin, 1986;
Folger, Rosenfield, & Robinson, 1983) were explicitly told that if
a different decision had been made they would have obtained a
favorable outcome, the classic work by Kahneman and Tversky
(1982) suggested that we did not have to explicitly inform partic-
ipants in our close-reference-point conditions that an alternative
situation would have yielded a different procedure or a different
outcome. This implied that we could confidently manipulate close-
ness of reference points without explicitly referring to justice-
related information (e.g., information about procedures or out-
comes). Thus, in our close-reference-point conditions, clear
alternative situations were available (viz. still being a member of
the previous group in Experiment 1 and having been assigned to a
different group in Experiment 2), but we did not explicitly inform
participants that the alternative situation would have yielded them
a different procedure or a different outcome. Following Kahneman
and Tversky (1982), our findings show that operationalizing close-
ness of reference points in this way yields hypothesized effects on
participants' reactions. An interesting implication of the findings
4
 Note that when both types of dependent variables are included in
justice experiments, affect and judgments of justice typically are highly
correlated. For example, in a recently conducted experiment by Miedema,
Van den Bos, and Vermunt (2001), Irsl > .58, p < .001. In the three
experiments by Van Prooijen, Van den Bos, and Wilke (2000), Irsl > .64,
ps < .001. In the two experiments by Van den Bos and Lind (in press), Irsl
> .68, ps < .001.
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by Kahneman and Tversky (1982) and those in the current article
therefore may be that having the opportunity to think of what
"might have been" is sufficient for people to imagine themselves
how things could have been better or worse. It is not necessary to
inform people explicitly that alternative situations would have
yielded them better or worse procedures or outcomes. This sug-
gests that referent thinking may play a broader, more important
role in the psychology of justice than has been proposed in previ-
ous RCT studies.
In Experiment 2, no statistically significant procedure effects
were found in the distant-reference-point condition, whereas sig-
nificant effects were found in Experiment 1 (albeit weaker than
those in the close-reference-point condition). These differential
results between experiments may have been caused by the fact that
we measured different variables in the two experiments. That is, it
has been reported before (see, e.g., Folger, Rosenfield, Rheaume,
& Martin, 1983; Van den Bos & Spruijt, in press) that judgments
related to fairness and justice (cf. Experiment 2) are less easily
affected by experimental manipulations than measures of affect are
(cf. Experiment 1). It should be emphasized here, however, that
although there are some differences between the results of our two
experiments, findings of both Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that the
voice effect in close referent situations is one in which being
denied voice leads to more negative reactions, whereas the pres-
ence of voice does not necessarily lead to more positive reactions.
This is a pattern that has been reported before in the research
literature (e.g., Van den Bos & Spruijt, in press): If (depending on
the levels of a moderator variable) people are significantly affected
by voice versus no-voice procedures, no-voice conditions fre-
quently lead to more negative reactions as opposed to voice
conditions leading to more positive judgments. This suggests that
what typically is labeled as the voice effect (suggesting more
positive judgments following voice) might actually be thought of
more properly as a no-voice effect (indicating more negative judg-
ments following no voice).
We think that the no-voice effect may be an interesting and
important new concept in the psychological literature on voice and
procedural justice. For example, it explains why in Experiment 2
we found that participants who received no voice opportunity in
the distant condition judged their procedure to be nearly as positive
as those who received voice: This line of reasoning suggests that
we found an absence of the no-voice effect. Furthermore, this also
may help to explain that significant effects of reference point were
found in the no-voice conditions of both experiments reported
here, whereas no statistically significant effects were found in the
voice conditions. More generally, the concept of the no-voice
effect is in correspondence with some notions that have been put
forth (cf. Folger, 1984) that, whereas we scientists tend to think
and talk about the psychology of justice, unjust events affect lay
people's cognitions and reactions more strongly than just events
(Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke,
1997), suggesting that injustice plays a more prominent role and
that it might be better to talk about the psychology of injustice as
opposed to justice (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998). Furthermore, it is
worthwhile to note here that there are other areas of research
within social psychology (e.g., person perception) in which nega-
tive information has been found to have more impact on people's
reactions than positive information does (e.g., Skowronski & Carl-
ston, 1989). Future research on social justice and injustice may
profit from insights developed in these areas of social psychology.
We reasoned that it made sense to begin our line of research by
performing empirical studies that enabled us to study the processes
we identified as clearly as possible and to achieve high internal
validity and experimental control: that is, experimental studies. In
our studies, we tried to achieve acceptable levels of external
validity. One way we tried to do this was to use stimulus materials
that had real-life characteristics and that were important for our
participants (and debriefing interviews indicated that we were
successful in this). Care must be taken, however, in generalizing
from the experimental findings presented here to real-world set-
tings. Although we are convinced that our analysis of the psychol-
ogy of voice is generalizable to other social contexts and opera-
tionalizations (see, e.g., Van den Bos, 1999), future researchers
may want to explore the boundary conditions of the effects re-
ported here. Furthermore, the present experiments showed a con-
firmation of a pattern of effects of some importance that happened
to have been predicted by RCT, but these patterns have implica-
tions that hold whether or not this theory holds up in the long run.
Other theories may be worthwhile to pursue in future studies.
However, what matters most is that the present experiments sug-
gest that particular effects may occur. This may stimulate future
researchers to explore other operationalizations, other research
methods, and other theories. As research accumulates concerning
the limiting conditions of voice and no-voice effects, as it has in
this study and in other studies (see, e.g., Folger, 1977; Lind et al.,
1990; Tyler, 1987), researchers begin to understand not only when
voice and no-voice effects disappear, but also a great deal about
why they occur at all and why they are so potent when they do
occur. This knowledge in turn promises to advance our under-
standing of fundamental issues in the social psychology of justice
and of the role of justice-related phenomena in basic social
relations.
We have argued that previous RCT studies show a distributive
orientation. This is indicated by the fact that all participants in
previous RCT studies by Cropanzano and Folger (1989), Folger
and Martin (1986), and Folger, Rosenfield, and Robinson (1983)
received unfavorable outcomes, which suggests that RCT assumed
that experiencing unfavorable outcomes is a necessary condition
before people start thinking about social justice issues (cf. Rutte &
Messick, 1995). Furthermore, previous RCT manipulations of
reference point were often induced by referring to outcome infor-
mation, and manipulations of procedure were less removed from a
purely instrumental interpretation than the current manipulations
of voice. Our findings show that manipulating outcome-unrelated
reference points (instead of outcome-related reference points; Cro-
panzano & Folger, 1989; Folger & Martin, 1986; Folger, Rosen-
field, & Robinson, 1983) independently of voice procedures (in-
stead of procedural justifications; Folger & Martin, 1986; Folger,
Rosenfield, & Robinson, 1983; or control; Cropanzano & Folger,
1989) without giving participants unfavorable outcomes is suffi-
cient to yield the effects RCT proposes. This suggests that the
implicit distributive focus in previous empirical RCT work is not
warranted and hence should not constitute a central element in the
RCT framework.
To put it differently, previous RCT studies implicitly suggested
that distributive information is essential in the psychology of social
justice. This assumption explicitly has been made in outcome-
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oriented articles (e.g., Rutte & Messick, 1995). Our findings show,
however, that RCT is a theory about not only distributive justice
but procedural justice as well. Thus, it can be concluded that RCT
is a theory about social justice (including both procedural and
distributive justice). This is an important implication of our study
because, now that it has been established that RCT is a theory
about both procedural and distributive justice, scientists can start
using the framework to provide new perspectives on the study of
conditions under which one type of justice is more important than
the other and vice versa (e.g., Van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke,
1997) and how the two types of justice relate to each other (cf.
Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996). We hope that the current article—
together with other important developments (e.g., Brockner &
Wiesenfeld, 1996)—may stimulate researchers to focus on these
important questions.
But, to return to the present study, the current article fits into a
tradition of important social-justice research in which suggestions
can be found that when people are forming fairness judgments they
do so by referring to reference points (see, e.g., Adams, 1965;
Blau, 1964; Homans, 1961; Stouffer et al., 1949; Thibaut &
Kelley, 1959). This suggests that insight into the role of reference
points is essential for understanding the psychology of justice. In
recent years, however, less and less attention has been paid to this
issue. In the current article, we try to show that the psychology of
procedural justice in general and voice in particular depends in
large part on reference points. We have done this by focusing on
RCT as the most recent and most thorough framework dealing
with reference points in the justice domain. The experiments
presented here expand RCT and point to the important role of
closeness of reference points in the psychology of voice.
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